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Market interest rates respond to discount rate changes. What is the reason for this response. This paper
investigates several competing hypotheses ofwhy marketsrespond to discount rate changes. Evidence that
the response is invariant to changes in the FederalReserve’s operating procedure suggests that it is purely an
“announcement effect.” Contrary to common beliefthe evidence suggests that the does not depend critically
on whether the discount rate changeis unanticipated, because all discount rate changes appearto be largely
unanticipated. Additional evidence suggests that, despite the factthat therehave been instances whendiscount
rate was used to signal a change in policy, e.g., the one percentage point increase in the discount rate in
October 1979, generally speaking, discountrate changes do not appear to have “signaled” a change in monetary
policy. This suggests that the common assertion that market interpret discount rate changes as a signal of a
changein Fedpolicy is incorrect. It appears that changes expectations about monetary policy is not the only
reason—and perhaps notthe most important reason--for the market’sreaction to changes in the discount rate.
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It is commonly believed that discount rate changes alter the
public’s expectations about the future course of monetary policy,
interest rates, prices and economic activity. At one time it was
believed that a discount rate announcement was an effective way to
inform the public of the Fed’s intentions and that such signaling had a
stabilizing effect on markets because it reinforced monetary policy
objectives. Analysis by Friedman (1959) and Smith (1956, 1958),
however, turned professional sentiment, if not the public’s perception,
away from this view.
Waud (1970) argued that establishing the statistical significance
of an announcement effect on interest rates, stock prices, etc. is
“logically prior” to determining the real impact of announcements on the
economy. Subsequent research has created a considerable volume of
empirical evidence suggesting that interest rates, stock prices and the
foreign exchange value of the dollar frequently do respond in a
statistically significant way to discount rate changes that are made for
reasons other than technical--i.e., other than to bring the discount
rate in line with market interest rates.1 What remains unclear,
however, is why markets respond to such announcements.
It is often asserted that interest rates respond to discount rate
changes because bank borrowing and, therefore, the supply of reserves is
positively related to federal funds-discount rate spread. Indeed, Roley
and Troll (1984) and Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) argue that because of
2the “direct effect” of discount rate changes on market interest rates,
interest rates should respond significantly to discount rate changes
only when the Fed is targeting non-borrowed reserves- -the response
should be insignificant when the Fed is targeting the federal funds
rate 2
Thornton (1986), however, argues that the fact that interest
rates respond only to non-technical discount rate changes is
inconsistent with the “direct effect” hypothesis because if this were
the case, market interest rates would respond to all discount rate
changes and not just to non-technical changes. Thornton (1982, 1986)
argues that the market does not respond to technical discount rate
changes because they do not provide markets with new information about
either the course of monetary policy or the economy: interest rates do
not respond to discount rate changes per Se, but to the new information
which the announcements provides.3 However, it is impossible to
separate Thornton’s “announcement effect” hypothesis from the “direct
effect” hypothesis if technical discount rate changes are anticipated,
while non-technical changes are not. Indeed, Smirlock and Yawitz (1985)
attribute the difference in the market’s response to technical and
non-technical discount rate changes as evidence of market efficiency,
arguing that the market responds only to non-technical discount rate
changes because technical changes are anticipated while non-technical
changes are not.4
While many analysts have attributed the market’s response to
discount rate changes as an “announcement effect,” historically there
have been two different, though not necessarily mutually exclusive,
3interpretations of the announcement effect. The first views
non-technical discount rate changes as a signal of a change in monetary
policy, with increases signaling a movement toward restraint and
decreases a movement toward ease.5 The second views discount rate
changes as the administrative action of a monetary authority who is in a
unique position to judge the course of interest rates or economic
activity, whether it is responsible for the course or not.6
Despite the wide variety of interpretations, relatively little
empirical work has been done to differentiate among these competing
hypotheses. This article attempts to fill this void. After reviewing
the important aspects of the various hypotheses and providing new and
very strong evidence that interest rates respond only to non-technical
discount rate changes, several hypotheses about why market interest
rates respond to non-technical changes in the discount rate are
systematically investigated.
Daily observations on the federal funds rate, the Three-month
T-bill rate, and the over-night RP rate are used to estimate the
response of interest rates to changes in the discount rate. The
evidence favors the “announcement effect” hypothesis over the “direct
effect” hypothesis by showing that technical changes are no more
anticipated than non-technical changes, and by showing--contrary to the
evidence presented by Roley and Troll (1984) and Smirlock and Yawitz
(l985)--that the effect of a non-technical change in the discount rate
is invariant to the Fed’s operating procedure. While the evidence about
the reason for the announcement effect is less definitive, it suggests
4that non-technical discount rate changes generally do not signal changes
in Federal Reserve policy.
1. THE EFFECT OF DISCOUNT RATE CHANGES AND THE FED’S OPERATING
PROCEDURE
Roley and Troll (1984) and Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) argue that
because a discount rate change has a direct effect on bank borrowing
and, hence, on interest rates, its effect should vary with the Federal
Reserve’s operating procedure. In particular, they suggest that the
market should not respond to a discount rate change when the Fed is
targeting the federal funds rate because the Fed would alter the supply
of non-borrowed reserves to offset the effect of the discount rate
change on market interest rates. This argument is illustrated in Figure
1. Panel A shows the possible combinations of the federal funds rate,
FFR, and non-borrowed reserves, NBR, that are consistent with an
equilibrium in the reserve market and panel B shows the demand for
borrowed reserves, BORR, conditional on the discount rate.7 An increase
in the discount rate reduces the supply of borrowed reserves relative to
total reserve demand. This shifts the demand for borrowed reserves to
the left and the equilibrium curve to the right- - the decline in borrowed
reserves implies the equilibrium funds rate must rise for a given level
of NBR. If the Fed were targeting the funds rate, however, the market
would anticipate that the Fed would increase the supply of non-borrowed
reserves to offset the effect of the decline in borrowed reserves on the
federal funds rate.
Alternatively, under a non-borrowed reserves operating procedure,
it is presumed that the Fed would maintain non-borrowed reserves at the
5target level. Under this operating procedure, the funds rate would rise
with the discount rate because of the reduction in borrowed reserves
induced by the narrowing of the spread between the two rates.8 Hence,
they conclude that there should be no statistically significant response
of market interest rates to a discount rate change when the Fed targeted
the federal funds rate and a significant response when the Fed targeted
non-borrowed reserves, as from October 1979 to October 1982.
There are several reasons to doubt this analysis and the
conclusion. First, the conclusion appears to be predicted on an
extremely narrow view of federal funds rate targeting, where the Fed
continuously holds the funds rate at the target level. This
characterization is at odds with the data. While it is true that daily
fluctuations in the federal funds rate were larger during the
non-borrowed reserves targeting period, daily movements in the funds
rate have been substantial, as we shall see, even when the Fed was
targeting it. After all, it is not the absolute movement in the funds
rate that is important for determining whether there is a “significant”
announcement effect, but its movement on days when discount rate changes
were announced relative to its “usual” daily variation.
Second, analogous reasoning suggests there should be no
announcement effect after the Fed’s switch to a borrowed reserves
operating procedure in October 1982, because the evidence suggests that
the Fed was essentially targeting the funds rate and not borrowed
reserves during much, if not all, of the post-1982 period.9
Third, even if the Fed’s operating procedure restrains the funds
rate, other short-term interest rates are not necessarily restrained by
6the Fed’s actions. Consequently, movements in these rates can be used
to gauge the market’s reaction to discount rate changes.
Fourth, this assertion ignores the fact that about half of the
discount rate changes that have been made during the past two decades
occurred prior to the Fed’s dramatic October-1979 change in operating
procedure. If the Fed were strictly targeting and controlling the
federal funds rate in the way suggested by these authors, there would be
no need for such changes. Alternatively, the Fed may use the discount
rate to signal its intentions to change the federal funds rate as Cook
and Hahn (1988) suggest or, more simply, merely signals its intention to
allow the funds rate to move with the market (discount rate changes tend
to be preceded by changes in market interest rates).10 Either way,
changes in the discount rate might be associated with statistically
significant changes in the funds rate even under interest rate
targeting.
Finally, previous research indicates that the response of market
interest rates to changes in the discount rate are solely or primarily
the result of an announcement effect. If the direct effect were
empirically relevant, it should emerge for both technical and
non-technical changes. But, the fact that research [Thornton (1982,
1986), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), Cook and Hahn (1988) and Batten and
Thornton (1984, 1985)] has established firmly that domestic interest
rates, the foreign exchange value of the dollar and stock prices respond
only to non-technical discount rate changes suggests it is the
announcement effect and not its direct effect on the supply of borrowed
reserves that moves the markets.11
71.1 Unanticipated Changes in the Discount Rate
To the extent that technical changes are anticipated, however, the
direct effect of technical changes will precede the announcement.
Interpreting technical changes as “anticipated” and non-technical
changes as “unanticipated”, Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) view the lack of
a statistically significant market response to technical changes as
evidence of market efficiency. It is certainly true that if markets are
efficient, discount rate changes can have a statistically significant
effect on market interest rates only if they are not anticipated fully.
Nevertheless, the lack of a market reaction does not necessarily imply
that discount rate changes are anticipated fully. While the market
might anticipate technical changes with certainty, it might not know the
exact timing of the change. Consequently, if the timing uncertainty is
the same for both technical and non-technical changes, their effect on
market interest rates would likely be the same, especially if the
reaction is due solely to changes in bank borrowing. However, if the
announcement of non-technical discount rate changes provides the market
with new information about monetary policy or the economy, the
differential response might be due to this and not because the former
are anticipated while the latter are not.12 Because the interpretation
is important, we test whether technical changes are anticipated while
non-technical ones are not. Failure to find that technical changes are
anticipated suggests that the market’s response to non-technical changes
is due to an announcement effect.13
82.0 THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS AND THE DATA
Tests of the effect of discount rate changes are based on an
efficient-markets view of interest rates. For simplicity, assume that
the best predictor of tomorrow’s interest rate is today’s rate. With
this assumption, market efficiency implies that
(1) i~ = E~1(i~) + = +
where denotes the response of the market to new information that it
receives in the ~ period.
In studies of the market’s response to discount rate changes, one
element of ~, a change in the discount rate, is explicitly identified.
That is, Equation 1 is rewritten as,
(2) i~ = i~1
± b~DR~ +
~DR denotes the change in the discount rate in the tth period, bi s a
parameter representing the average response of interest rates to
unanticipated changes in the discount rate and denotes all other news
that affects market interest rates. It is assumed that
t7~—N(0, a2) and E(ADR~?7~) = 0. The market’s response to discount rate
changes is usually tested by a simple t-test of the coefficient bi nan
equation like Equation 2.
2.1. The Data
To investigate the effect of discount rate changes, daily data on
two overnight rates, the federal funds rate (FFR) and the repurchase
rate (RPR), and the 3-month T-bill rate (TBR) for the period from
January 3, 1972 to August 23, 1989 are used. FFR is the weighted
average of rates on daily transactions for a group of federal funds
brokers and RPR is a weighted average of rates between 8:00 and 10:00
9a.m. E.S.T. Both rates are compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. TBR is the rate at “market close,” around 4:00 p.m., E.S.T.
Discount rate changes are timed by when the announcement of the discount
rate change was first made public. Changes in market interest rates are
aligned with changes in the discount rate so that the change in the
relevant interest rate can reflect the announcement of the discount rate
change. Discount rate changes are classified as technical, L~DR(l),
partially technical and partially non-technical, L~DR(2), or purely
non-technical, ~DR(3), depending on whether the Fed’s announcement
stated that the change was made solely to keep the discount rate in line
with market interest rates, gave this as one of the reasons for the
action, or simply made a statement about policy and the state of the
economy. The dates of discount rate changes (by the effective date),
size of discount rate changes by type and the corresponding changes in
the three interest rates are reported in Table 1.
2.2 Heteroskedasticity
The heteroskedastic nature of these data is illustrated in Table
2, which reports the variance for changes in each rate for
reserve-settlement Wednesdays and Thursdays, WTH, and all other days,
MTF, for the entire period and for the sub-periods where there was a
marked change in the variance. While all three rates are characterized
by heteroskedasticity, it is particularly true of the federal funds rate
whose variance changes markedly over time and by day of the week. An
F-test at the equality of the variance are Wednesdays and Thursdays and
all other days against the alternative that the variance is larger on
the former days, is presented on the third column. The test indicates
10that, generally, the variance of i~FFRis significantly larger on
settlement Wednesdays and Thursdays for the entire period and in each of
the three sub-periods. The variance of ~RPR is also significantly
larger on settlement Wednesdays and Thursdays than on other days in two
of the three sub-periods. In all but the last period, however, the
increase in variance is small relative to that of the funds rate. In
contrast to both of these rates, the variance of i~TBRis consistently
smaller on settlement Wednesdays and Thursdays, although not
significantly so.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
For evidence of an announcement effect to be persuasive, changes
in the discount rate should be associated with “large” movements in
market rates nearly every time the discount rate is changed. Moreover,
the “large” movements should be pervasive across short-term interest
rates. From Equation 2 we can see that the variance of the change in
the interest rate equals b2var(DR~)+ a2 on days when there are
unanticipated discount rate changes and a2,~ on other days. Hence, the
impact of a specific discount rate change on the market can be assessed
by determining whether the change in market interest rates on that day
are larger than on days when there were no changes in the discount rate.
This can be done efficiently by simply estimating the equation
(3) L~i~ = X~3’+ c~, t = 1, 2, ..., T,
where Ti sthe number of observations on Ai~and is an N dimensional
row vector of observations on discount rate changes in the ~ period.
That is, X~=(O, 0, 0, I~DR~, 0, ..., 0) if there was a discount rate
change in the period. If there was no discount rate change, X~=(0, 0,
110, ..., 0). N is the number of discount rate changes in the T periods
and ~ is an N dimensional row vector of parameters, i3=(/3,, ~~2’ •~,
While the estimated parameters in Equation 3 are of no interest, per Se,
their t-statistics indicate the number of standard errors by which the
market interest rate changed on the day of an announced change in the
discount rate relative to all other days.14 Hence, the t-statistics
indicate whether specific discount rate changes were associated with
“large” changes in market interest rates. Moreover, this specification
is very general -- all tests of the effect of discount rate changes,
e.g., Equation 2, are restricted versions of Equation 3.
The t-statistics from estimating Equation 3 are presented in Table
3. All of the estimated equations are adjusted for heteroskedasticity
by allowing the variance to differ in each of the three sub-periods
given in Table 2 for all three interest rates and by the first and last
day of the year and on settlement Wednesdays and Thursdays and during
each of the three sub-periods for FFR and RPR.15 Dummy variables for
settlement Wednesdays (DW) and Thursdays (DTH) are included in all of
the estimated equations along with a distributed lag of order 10 of the
dependent variable; however, the estimated coefficients on the dummy and
distributed lag variables are not reported because they are of no
particular interest.16
Few type 1 discount rate changes have t-statistics larger than two
in absolute value, and only one, DR(l)20, has a t-statistic greater than
two for all three interest rates. It is interesting to note that this
change was announced only two days after the Fed announced its decision
to de-emphasize Ml as a monetary policy target. Hence the market may
12have perceived it as more than a mere technical change. Thornton (1986)
shows that this observation alone accounts for the statistically
significant effect of type 1 discount rate changes on the 3-month T-bill
rate over the period from October 1982 through June 1986.
Also, there was one instance where the t-statistic was greater
than two for both FFR and RPR, DR(l)5. This discount rate change was
announced on Tuesday, February 4, 1975 and was effective on settlement
Wednesday, February 5. On Wednesday the RP and federal funds rates
dropped 94 and 174 basis points, respectively, only to recover 63 and
137 basis points, respectively, on the following Thursday. In contrast,
TBR declined 15 basis points on Wednesday and recovered all 15 basis
points on Thursday. Another type 1 discount rate change that produced a
t-statistic greater than two for the federal funds rate, DR(l)14,
occurred on Wednesday, May 28, 1980 and was effective on Thursday, May
29. On Wednesday the federal funds rate increased by 265 basis points
and fell 174 basis points on Thursday: RRP and TBR reported modest
increases on both Wednesday and Thursday. Thus, it appears that the
larger drop in the funds rate on Thursday was a normal readjustment to
Wednesday’s increase and not due to the minus one percentage point
technical realignment of the discount rate. The only other type 1
discount rate change that had a t-statistic greater than two on the
federal funds rate had a negative sign. Indeed, it is interesting to
note that nearly half of the discount rate changes made for technical
reasons are associated with movements in market rates in the opposite
direction. These results support earlier findings [Thornton (1982,
1986), Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985),
13Cook and Hahn (1988)] that the market does not respond to discount rate
changes made for solely technical reasons.
An analysis of the effects of individual type 2 and 3 discount
rate changes shows that there were only ,~ instances when all three
rates moved by more than two standard errors in response to the same
discount rate change. Both were type 2 changes and both occurred during
the period when the Fed was paying particular attention to Ml. If the
criterion was reduced to 1.5 standard errors, the number of simultaneous
responses increases to six. Thus, it does not appear that the market’s
response to non-technical discount rate changes is pervasive. It is
reasonable to expect discount rate changes to affect all three markets
simultaneously. That this does not appear to be the case suggests that
either the markets do not always respond to the announcement of a
discount rate change or that, often, idiosyncratic shocks in a
particular market mute the market’s reaction. Either way, these results
are troublesome for those who believe that discount rate changes have a
consistent effect across short-term interest rates.
Troubling as the above results are, it is customary to gauge the
market’s average response to discount rate changes. This is done by
imposing the constraints, ‘~i=~~2=~ •~N’ in Equation 3. With these
restrictions, and allowing for a differential effect by the type of
discount rate changes, Equation 3 can be written as
(4) L~i~ = a0
± AE~DR(l)~ + ,thDR(2)~+ 6t1DR(3)~+ ~ tl, 2, . .., T.
Estimates of Equation 4 are reported in Table 4. On average, type
1 discount rate changes have no statistically significant effect on the
federal funds rate, but have a significant effect on both the RP and
14T-bill rates. This result, however, merely reflects the previously
noted lack of a pervasive effect for type 1 discount rate changes, and
the sensitivity of least-squares to “outliers.” The statistical
significance of RPR and TBR is due solely to one discount rate change,
DR(l)20, when the Fed announced it would de-emphasize Ml. When this
discount rate change is deleted, the coefficients on the two rates drop
to .183 and .042, respectively, and they are no longer statistically
significant (the t-statistics are 1.86 and .808, respectively). Hence,
consistent with our previous findings and all other empirical work,
market interest rates generally do not respond significantly to type 1
discount rate changes.
Also, the average response of FFR to type 3 discount rate changes
is larger than for type 2 changes, while the responses of both RPR and
TBR are smaller. Consistent with the results of Cook and Hahn (1988),
however, in no case is the difference statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
3.1 Are Discount Rate Changes Anticipated?
There are two possible explanations of why markets do not respond
to type 1 discount rate changes. If type 1 changes are anticipated and
the others are not, the effect of anticipated discount rate changes
would already be reflected in market rates, so that the markets would
react only to type 2 and 3 discount rates changes. Alternatively, type
2 and 3 discount rate changes are accompanied by a statement about
policy or the state of the economy and type 1 changes are not.
Consequently, type 2 and 3 changes provide the market with new
information not provided by type 1 changes.
15To test whether discount rate changes are anticipated, the
equation
-l -l
(5) i~i~ = a + E j~ADR(l)-. + E 6.ADR(2+3)~.+ e
0 j=-K J tj j=-K JJ t
is estimated, where K is the number of days prior to the announcement of
a discount rate change. Because the response to type 2 and 3 discount
rate changes is the same, they are combined. If type 1 discount rate
changes lack an announcement effect because they are anticipated, the
null hypothesis that the lead coefficients are jointly zero should be
rejected. Conversely, if the type 2 and 3 discount rate changes are
unanticipated, the corresponding null hypothesis should not be rejected.
The results of these tests for K = 10, 20 and 30 are presented in
Table 5. For FFR the null hypothesis is rejected for both type 1 and
type 2±3discount rate changes for all three orders of the leads.
Hence, they provide no support for the hypothesis that type 1 changes
are anticipated, while the others are not. The results for RPR or TBR
also provide little support for this hypothesis. These results are
consistent with those of Hakkio and Pearce (1991), and suggest that
technical discount rate changes are no more predictable than
non-technical changes.’7 Type 1 discount rate changes do not provide
new information about monetary policy or the economy. Consequently,
they do not evoke an announcement effect.
3.2 Does the Announcement Effect Vary With the
Fed’s Operating Procedure?
The possibility that the announcement effect for non-technical
discount rate changes varies with the Fed’s operating procedure is
16investigated by partitioning discount rate changes by whether they
occurred before, during or after the period of non-borrowed reserve
targeting, October 9, 1979 to October 6, 1982. Because there were only
two type 3 discount rate changes during this period (one of them was
made in October 9, 1979, coincident with the announcement of the move to
monetary aggregate targeting), type 2 and type 3 changes are combined.18
The results, reported in Table 6, are broadly similar for FFR and TBR.
Unlike Smirlock and Yawitz and Roley and Troll, we find that the
response of the TBR is statistically significant regardless of the Fed’s
operating procedure: the response was significantly larger during the
non-borrowed reserves targeting period and not significantly different
during the earlier and later periods.’9 The results for the federal
funds rate are similar to those of the T-bill rate; however, the those
for RPR differ slightly. The response during the period of non-borrowed
reserves targeting was significantly larger than that for the other
periods, however, there was no statistically significant response in the
pre-nonborrowed reserve targeting period.20
Taken together, the results in Tables 3-6 show that although the
response varies both in magnitude and intensity across rates and
monetary policy operating regimes, market interest rates respond
significantly only to discount rate changes that the Fed announces are
made for other than purely technical reasons. The fact that the
response to discount rate changes is significantly larger when the Fed
was targeting non-borrowed reserves is not surprising because, as we
have already noted, daily movements in interest rates were much larger
during this period. The relevant issue is the size of the relative
17response. Since these estimates were adjusted for heteroskedasticity,
this question can be addressed by comparing the “t-statistics” during
the three periods. This comparison suggests that with the possible
exception of the TBR, the relative response was not larger when the Fed
was targeting non-borrowed reserves. In any event, the fact that
markets respond significantly during all three periods is consistent
with the view that the response is to the new information that the
announcement provided and not to a direct effect of discount rate
changes on the supplies of money and credit.
3.3 Do Discount Rate Changes Signal a Change in Monetary Policy?
While the evidence suggests that there is an announcement effect,
it is not clear whether markets responded because discount rate changes
signal a change in monetary policy. One way to assess whether changes
in the discount rate have historically signaled a change in policy is to
see whether the growth rates of variables over which the Fed has direct
control changed following discount rate changes.21 The problem with
implementing this test is that the growth rates of variables over which
the Fed has direct control, non-borrowed reserves, total reserves and
the adjusted monetary base, are only available weekly before February
1984 and biweekly thereafter. Moreover, these series are highly
variable at that frequency so it is difficult to obtain precise measures
of their average growth rates during short periods between discount rate
changes. While the results of such tests are consistent with the
conclusion that discount rate changes generally have not been indicative
in monetary policy changes, they are not reliable.22
18An alternative approach stems from the well-known observation
supported by the results in Table 5, that interest rates generally drift
in the direction of a discount rate change before the discount rate
change is announced. This significant drift could stem from policy
actions or from factors unrelated to policy. In either event, if a
change in the discount rate signals a change in the growth rate of
reserves or the monetary base, one might expect to see a change in the
drift of interest rates. Finding no significant “shift in the drift” is
consistent with the view that discount rate changes do not signal
changes in monetary policy.
One can test a significant shift in the drift by estimating the
equation
(6) L~i~ = a0
± a1DRIFTb + a2DRIFT +
where DRIFTb is a dummy variable equal to one for K days before the
discount rate change and zero otherwise and DRIFT3 is a dummy variable
equal to one for the day the discount rate change is effective and for
the next K days and zero otherwise. Including the day of the
significant announcement effect in DRIFTa biases the test in favor of
finding a significant shift in the drift.23 Because market rates
generally do not respond to type 1 discount rate changes, only type 2
and 3 changes are used in these tests. Two drift parameters were
estimated, one for positive changes in the discount rate (DRIFTPOS) and
one for negative changes (DRIFTNEG).
Estimates of Equation 6 for the values of K, 5, 10 and 15, are
presented in Table 7. The coefficients on the “before” drift variables
are nearly always statistically significant and have the anticipated
19sign, confirming the observation that the market tends to lead discount
rate changes in the same direction. Differences between the “before”
and “after” coefficients generally are not statistically significant,
however. There were two instances where the difference is significant,
for FFR for discount rate increases and for RPR for discount rate
decreases. In these cases, however, as in nearly all others, the
absolute magnitude of the differences gets smaller as K increases.
Indeed, the difference is not statistically significant for RPR for
K=l5.
The evidence suggests that generally the Fed has not signaled
policy changes with the discount rate. Of course, this does not mean
that the Fed has never used discount rate changes for this purpose or
that, on occasion, the market has not interpreted a discount rate change
as a signal of a change in monetary policy even if that was not the
Fed’s intent.24 Furthermore, the Fed may use the discount rate to
communicate a change in its target for the federal funds rate. Such a
change would not necessarily require a change in the growth rate of
reserves, yet it could be interpreted by some as a change in monetary
policy.25 In any event, the fact that there is no evidence that the Fed
changes its policy with respect to the growth rate of reserves or the
monetary base following a change in the discount rate means that one
should be careful about interpreting a change in the discount rate as a
signal of a change in monetary policy. It seems equally plausible that
the market responds to new information that the announcement provides
about the health of the economy.
204. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
A considerable volume of empirical literature has established that
markets react to changes in the Federal Reserve’s discount rate and a
number of alternative hypotheses for this reaction have been suggested.
This paper investigates the reaction of the federal funds, three-month
T-bill and overnight RP rates to changes in the discount rate and
presents the results of several tests designed to differentiate among
competing hypotheses. The evidence suggests that the market’s response
is due simply to an announcement effect. Both intuition and empirical
evidence reject the suggestion by Roley and Troll (1984) and Smirlock
and Yawitz (1985) that market interest rates should not react to
discount rate changes during periods when the Fed is targeting the
federal funds rate.
The evidence presented here also challenges the hypothesis that
markets do not respond to technical discount rate changes because they
are anticipated. Both technical and non-technical changes tend to
follow, rather than lead, the market, and the exact timing of either
change cannot be anticipated perfectly. Consequently, it is hard to
believe that the dramatic, and well-documented, difference in the
market’s response to the two types of discount rate changes is due
solely to the market correctly anticipating technical discount rate
changes, but not non-technical changes. It appears that markets do not
respond to technical changes simply because such announcements provide
no information.
The Fed has given a variety of explanations for making
non-technical changes in the discount rate, and seldom makes a direct
21statement of its policy intentions in announcing a discount rate change.
Despite this fact, it is often assumed that the market responds to such
changes because they “signal” a change in monetary policy. Making use
of the fact that such discount rate changes follow, rather than lead the
market, this proposition was tested indirectly. The results suggest
that, historically, non-technical discount rate changes generally have
not “signaled” a change in monetary policy.
These results are only suggestive, however. Certainly, they
cannot rule out the possibility that a particular discount rate change
conveyed information about monetary policy. Indeed, casual observation
suggests that, at times, discount rate changes do convey such
information. The most striking example of such an announcement is the
one made in October 1979, when the Fed underscored its intent to fight
inflation by announcing that it was raising the discount rate a full
percentage point. This announcement was associated with 225, 90 and 112
basis-point changes in the federal funds rate, the over-night RP rate
and the three-month T-bill rate, respectively, and with a dramatic
change in the growth rates of reserves and the money supply. In this
instance, however, the Fed simultaneously announced it was shifting to a
“reserve-oriented” operating procedure. Hence, the market’s response
may have been due to the announcement of a shift in monetary policy and
not to the announcement of a discount rate change per Se. Nevertheless,
this event suggests that the market does respond to new, significant
policy information. Whether the response of the market to non-technical
discount rate changes is always for this reason, much less clear.
22Finally, a detailed analysis of the response to individual
discount rate changes suggests that markets often do not appear to
respond at all to non-technical discount rate changes, or that often the
three interest rates used here do not appear to respond simultaneously.
This suggests that the exact nature and anticipated usefulness of the
information that such announcements provide may vary from announcement
to announcement. While caution is required, it seems reasonable that
identically worded announcements could have vastly different affects
depending on the circumstances in the market at the time- - including how
much the market is taken by surprise. The results here merely suggest
that the market’s reaction to a non-technical discount rate change is an
“announcement effect,” that the announcement effect is invariant to the
Fed’s operating procedure, and that changing expectations about monetary
policy is not the only reason- - and perhaps not the most important
reason--for the market’s reaction.
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25FOOTNOTES
1. This literature includes Waud (1970), Lombra and Torto (1977), Brown
(1981), Thornton (1982, 1986), Batten and Thornton (1984, 1985), Mudd
(1979), Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) and Cook and Hahn (1988).
2. Roley and Troll (1984) term the market’s response to a discount rate
change an “announcement effect,” however, their analysis rests on the
assumption that discount rate changes are transmitted to market interest
rates through their effect on the supply of borrowed reserves.
3. Announcements of discount rate changes rarely provide explicit
reference to monetary policy. See the reasons for changing the discount
rate given in Thornton (1982, 1986) and Batten and Thornton (1984).
4. Smirlock and Yawitz were concerned with the apparent discrepancy
between the observation (Lombra and Torto (1977)) and Santomero (1983).
5. A variant of this explanation requires the Fed merely to remain
committed to a given policy or operating procedure. In October 1979 the
Fed switched to a non-borrowed reserves operating procedure. It is
argued that under lagged reserves accounting, fixing the level of
non-borrowed reserves is tantamount to fixing the level of aggregate
borrowing. Because borrowing is a function of the spread between the
funds rate and discount rate, many authors have interpreted this as
fixing the level of the funds rate. Under these conditions, changes in
the discount rate would be reflected in the funds rate point-for-point
if the non-borrowed reserves target is unchanged and if the demand for
borrowed reserves is stable. A similar analysis would hold for the
post-October 1982 period. Since then, the Fed has followed a
borrowed-reserves operating procedure. Under this procedure, too, there
would be a one-to-one correspondence between changes in the discount
rate and the federal funds rate.
Thornton (1988) discusses the effect of a discount rate change on
the federal funds rate under a strict borrowed reserves operating
procedure, where the demand for borrowed reserves is stable, and under a
non-borrowed reserves operating procedure. The evidence is that the
function is not stable, however, so this argument lacks credibility.
6. Waud (1970) provides a description of this hypothesis. He attributes
it to Friedman (1959).
7. The details of this model are found in Thornton (1988).
8. It is interesting to note that this interpretation could not be
correct since 1988 because, since then, borrowing has been unresponsive
to even large changes in the spread between the federal funds and
26discount rates. See Clouse (1990) for an analysis of discount window
borrowing.
Roley and Troll (1984) conjecture about a possible announcement
effect due to an anticipated change in monetary policy, stating that the
“public may further infer a change in the entire short-run money stock
path, causing the discount rate change to affect both short and
long-term interest rates.” However, this announcement effect is not an
integral part of their analysis of the differential effect of discount
rate changes under alternative Fed operating regimes.
9. See Thornton (1988) and Feinman (1990).
10. Such an action created a lot of hoopla in the press when the
December 18, 1990 discount rate reduction, an action taken by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was allowed to “show through”
to the federal funds rate, the short-run policy target of the FOMC. The
Wall Street Journal (l99la,b).
11. The results for stock prices have been confirmed by the author but
are not reported here.
12. Smirlock and Yawitz (1985) note this problem in a footnote, stating
that if the timing uncertainty were the same for both types of discount
rate changes, “market efficiency would lead us to assert that the
announcement effect of a nontechnical change exceeds that associated
with a technical change.” Presumably, this is due to their
interpretation of non-technical changes, which they assert “contain some
informative policy implications.” See Smirlock and Yawitz (1985), p.
1142. It should be noted, however, that most often such announcements
do not give any direct information about the direction of monetary
policy. “Informative policy implications” usually must be inferred.
See Thornton (1982, 1986) and Batten and Thornton (1984) for paraphrased
announcements for most of the discount rate changes used here.
13. Indeed, the direct effect should be somewhat larger for technical
changes since the effect on the spread between the discount and market
interest rates is larger in the case where the latter do not respond.
Thornton (1986) presents two other pieces of evidence that suggest the
money market’s reaction is due to an announcement effect and not the
direct effect. First, he notes that the response of market interest
rates to changes in the discount rate should be larger under a borrowed
reserves operating procedure if the response is due solely to a direct
effect and shows that this is not the case. Indeed, the response is
smaller, though not statistically so. Second, causality should run from
FFR rate to TBR rate. He finds, however, unidirectional causality
running from TBR to FFR.
14. To see this rewrite Equation 3 more compactly as i~i= X~+ e, where L~i
is a T by 1 vector of observations are the interest rates and X is T by N
matrix of “observed” discount rate changes. Now ~ = (X’ XY~X’L~i
and the vector of t-statistics is just a/a, where~a is the usual
27least-squares estimate of the standard error. Some straight-forward
algebra shows that the ~th element of this N by 1 vector is ~ Because
the equation is fit without error on each day when there is a change in the
discount rate, ~ is the estimated standard error on days when there are no
changes in the discount rate.
15. The estimation was carried out via a two-step generalized least squares
estimation procedure.
16. For FFR and RPR the hypothesis that the coefficients on the dummy
variables for Wednesday and Thursday are equal with opposite signs cannot
be rejected. However, the coefficients on RPR are much smaller than those
on FFR. This suggests that the “Wednesday weakness” spills over nearly
identically into Thursday.
Dummy variables for the first and last day of the year also were
included in all equations; however, they were never statistically
significant so they are not reported.
17. Hakkio and Pearce do not address this question directly; however, this
result can be obtained by simply comparing their results for technical and
non-technical discount rate changes.
18. The equation was also estimated by including the type 2 and 3 changes
separately, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
those presented here.
19. The difference between these results and those reported by Roley and
Troll (1984) can likely be explained by their failure to distinguish
between technical and non-technical discount rate changes, their short
sample for the pre-nonborrowed reserves operating procedure and their
failure to adjust for heteroskedasticity. The discrepancy between our
results and those of Smirlock and Yawitz is more difficult to explain
because they differentiated between technical and non-technical changes.
Although their sample period, January 2, 1975 to October 5, 1979, is
somewhat shorter, it contains nine of the fourteen type 2 and type 3
discount rate changes considered here for the pre-nonborrowed reserve
targeting period. Hence, the difference is likely due to something else,
perhaps a misalignment of changes on the funds rate with changes in the
discount rate. In any event, the results here clearly show that there was
a statistically significant response of the T-bill rate to non-technical
discount rate changes for periods of federal funds rate targeting both
before and after the Fed’s flirtation with a non-borrowed reserves
operating procedure.
20. Very early in the sample, RPR appeared to lack variability. These data
are of suspicious quality until about the mid-l970s.
2821. Cook and Hahn (1988) offer a particular variant of this hypothesis,
arguing that non-technical discount rate changes signal the Fed’s intention
to change its target level for the federal funds rate. Their analysis
suggests that the T-bill rate should change point-for-point with the
federal funds rate; however, the evidence presented here suggests that this
is not the case. Indeed, the null hypothesis that the response of the
federal funds and T-bill rates is equal for ADR(2+3) is easily rejected.
The “t-statistic” for an asymptotic test of this hypothesis is 5.77,
compared with a critical value of 2.33 at the 1 percent significance level.
For a critical analysis of Cook and Hahn’s results, see Thornton (1991).
22. In an attempt to provide some direct evidence on this question, the
growth rates of two reserve aggregates, total reserves (adjusted for
reserve requirement changes) and non-borrowed reserves, were regressed on
dummy variables for K-periods before and after type 2 and 3 discount rate
changes. These estimates were adjusted for heteroskedasticity using
White’s (1980) consistent estimator. Because the anticipated direction of
the change in the growth rate depends on the direction of the discount rate
change, the dummy variables associated with discount rate increases were
multiplied by negative one. Hence, under the usual hypothesis, there
should be a significant negative relationship between changes in the
discount rate and changes in the growth rates of these reserve aggregates
[This is essentially the “event study” analysis of Brown and Warner (1980,
1985)]. The equations were estimated using biweekly data for the entire
sample period and weekly data prior to the Fed’s switch to a two-week
reserve maintenance period in February 1984. Several values of K were
used. In nearly all cases the coefficients on the dummy variables were not
significant and, they were not even negative when weekly data were used.
There was only one instance where the results were consistent with the
conventional view, using total reserves and biweekly data with K=l0. The
adjusted R-square for this equation was very low (less than .015), however,
and the results were very sensitive to the choice of K. Hence, these
results provide no support for the notion that discount rate changes signal
a change in monetary policy.
23. Because of this, the tests were also done by simply using K days before
and after the announcement. Done in this way, the relevant F-test was
statistically significant only for positive changes for the federal funds
rate. And then only for K equal to 5 or 10.
24. October 6, 1979 is an example of an instance when the Fed underscored
its policy intentions with a discount rate change.
25. Indeed, the fact that market rates respond immediately to changes in
the discount rate, but that there is no significant “shift in the drift”
suggests discount rate changes result in a permanent change in interest
rates. As noted earlier, however, this results stems directly from the
random walk specification, where all shocks are permanent- -such
specifications do not allow for the dynamic response of the structure of
interest rates to such shocks.
29Table 1
Changes in the Discount Rate by Type
Type 1
~DR ~.FFR ARPR LiTBR
Effective
Number Date
1 01/15/73 0.50 0.125 0.00 0.03
2 04/23/73 0.25 —0.500 0.00 0.06
3 05/11/73 0.25 0.187 0.12 0.23
4 08/14/73 0.50 —0.150 0.13 0.23
5 02/05/75 —0.50 —1.740 —0.94 —0.15
6 05/16/75 —0,25 0.010 —0.07 0.01
7 01/19/76 —0.50 —0.030 0.00 —0.08
8 11/22/76 —0.25 —0,060 —0.15 —0.06
9 08/30/77 0.50 —0.010 0.00 0.02
10 10/26/77 0.25 0.110 —0.05 —0.05
11 05/11/78 0.50 0.040 0.05 —0.07
12 07/03/78 0.25 —0.370 0.00 —0.06
13 09/19/79 0.50 —0.420 0.00 —0.20
14 05/29/80 —1.00 —1.740 0.25 0.22
15 06/13/80 —1.00 —0.040 —0.20 —0.02
16 07/28/80 —1.00 0.340 0.10 0.16
17 11/02/81 —1.00 0.620 0.00 —0.06
18 12/04/81 —1.00 —0.820 —0.20 —0.58
19 08/27/82 —0.50 0.550 1.00 0.70
20 10/12/82 —0.50 —0,430 —0.70 —0.37
21 04/09/84 0.50 —0.050 —0.15 —0.09
22 04/21/86 —0.50 0.290 0.15 0.00
23 07/11/86 —0.50 —0.310 —0.30 —0.10
Type 2
1 02/26/73 0.50 0.375 0.19 0.21
2 06/11/73 0.50 0.188 —0.19 0.08
3 04/25/74 0.50 0.950 0.63 0.19
4 12/09/74 —0.25 0.030 0.19 —0.18
5 03/10/75 —0.50 —0.100 0.04 0.06
6 09/22/78 0.25 0.010 —0.05 0.11
7 10/16/78 0.50 0.110 0.05 0.06
8 07/20/79 0.50 0.200 —0.05 0.16
9 09/26/80 1.00 0.690 0.80 0.46
10 11/17/80 1.00 1.990 1.15 0.80
11 12/05/80 1.00 1.210 2.45 0.98
12 05/05/81 1.00 —0.280 —0.20 0.60
13 07/20/82 —0.50 —0.870 —0.45 —0.40
14 08/02/82 —0.50 —0.580 —1.40 —0.81
15 08/16/82 —0.50 —0.470 —0.40 —0.58
16 11/22/82 —0.50 —0.270 —0.40 —0.14
17 12/24/84 —0.50 —0.530 —0.55 —0.13
18 05/20/85 —0.50 —0.250 —0.50 —0.14
19 03/07/86 —0.50 —0.270 —0.10 —0.08




Number Date ~DR ~FFR LiRPR L~TBR
1 07/02/73 0.50 1.125 0.19 0.38
2 01/06/75 -0.50 -0.520 -0.44 -0.06
3 01/09/78 0.50 0.170 0.05 0.39
4 08/21/78 0.50 0.200 0.05 -0.04
5 11/01/78 1.00 0.520 0.10 0.10
6 08/17/79 0.50 -0.300 -0.05 0.06
7 10/09/79 1.00 2.250 0.90 1.12
8 02/15/80 1.00 0.370 0.20 0.57
9 12/14/82 -0.50 -0.440 -0.30 -0.32
10 11/23/84 -0.50 -0.350 -0.30 -0.10
11 08/21/86 -0.50 -0.300 -0.40 -0.13
12 09/04/87 0.50 0.010 0.00 0.19
13 02/24/89 0.50 0.190 0.20 0.04Table 2
Variances of Daily Changes in FFR, RPR and TBR
WTH MTF F
1/3/72 —— 10/5/79
FFR .3989 .0312 12.78*
RPR .0690 .0309 2.23*
TBR .0096 .0132 0.72
10/8/79 —— 10/5/82
FFR 1.0790 .3946 2.73*
RPR .3913 .3366 1.16
TER .0528 .1058 0.50
10/6/82 —— 2/1/84
FFR .1162 .0746 1.56*
RPR .0919 .2010 0.46
TBR .0044 .0095 0.46
2/2/84 —— 8/9/89
FFR .5687 .1042 5.46*
RPR .6200 .0593 10.45*
TBR .0056 .0067 0.83
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent
level.Table 3
Estimates of Equation 3
Independent
Variable FFR RPR TBR
Constant —1.53 0.97 2.95*
DR(1) 1 0.75 —0.08 0.20
DR(1) 2 _2.34* —0.24 0.53
DR(1) 3 1.28 0.79 2.06*
DR(1) 4 —0.01 0.86 2.02*
DR(l) 5 9.90* 5.67* 1.30
DR(1) 6 0.07 0.34 0.05
DR(l) 7 0.14 0.14 0.90
DR(1) 8 0.38 0.95 0.43
DR(l) 9 0.06 0.05 0.02
DR(1) 10 0.88 —0.02 —0.38
DR(l) 11 —0.37 —0.10 —0.64
DR(1) 12 _l.74** —0.04 —0.71
DR(1) 13 _1.71** 0.38 _1.90**
DR(l) 14 2.35* —0.28 —0.69
DR(l) 15 0.52 0.64 0.11
DR(1) 16 —0.59 —0.20 —0.46
DR(1) 17 —0.76 0.14 0.21
DR(1) 18 1.17 0.22 2.06*
DR(1) 19 —0.85 _1.51** _2.48*
DR(1) 20 2.76* 3.28* 4~97*
DR(l) 21 0.15 —0.45 —1.01
DR(l) 22 —1.09 —0.40 0.16
DR(1) 23 1.52** 1.62** 1.21
DR(2) 1 2.09* 0.80 1.89**
DR(2) 2 1.20 —0.75 0.76
DR(2) 3 4.32* 2.88* 1.84**
DR(2) 4 0.29 —0.89 1.72**
DR(2) 5 0.74 —0.16 —0.35
DR(2) 6 0.20 —0.31 1.04
DR(2) 7 0.49 0.30 0.4].
DR(2) 8 1.26 —0.61 1.41
DR(2) 9 1.30 1.37 1.39
DR(2) 10 3.24* 2.09* 2.72*
DR(2) 11 2.32* 4.83* 3,39*
DR(2) 12 0.05 0.16 1.56**
DR(2) 13 1.75** 1.44 1.62**
DR(2) 14 0.84 2.66* 2.83*Table 3 Continued
Page 2
Independent
Variable FFR RPR TBR
DR(2) 15 0.85 0.54 1.98**
DR(2) 16 ]..77** 2.33* 1.48
DR(2) 17 2.57* 3.12* 1.69**
DR(2) 18 1.10 2.55* 1.88**
DR(2) 19 1.37 0.68 0.81
DR(2) 20 0.09 0.07 2.77*
DR(3) 1 6.50* 1.50~-* 3~35*
DR(3) 2 2.91* 2.88* 0.47
DR(3) 3 0.78 0.30 3~55*
DR(3) 4 1.32 0.47 —0.50
DR(3) 5 3.38* 0.92 0.97
DR(3) 6 0.22 0.06 0.56
DR(3) 7 3.62* l.55** 3,94*
DR(3) 8 0.76 0.30 ].,97**
DR(3) 9 2,10* 1.49** 4.03*
DR(3) 10 2,26* 2.58* 0.96
DR(3) 11 1.43 2.27* l.58**
DR(3) 12 0.04 0.13 2.11*
DR(3) 13 1.09 ].,54** 0.3].
* indicates t—statistics greater than two.
** indicates t-statistics greater than 1.5.
Absolute value of t—statistics in parentheses.Table 4
Response of Interest Rates to Discount Rate Changes by Type
Interest Rate
Independent
Variable FFR RPR TBR
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* indicates statistical significance at 5 percent level.
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Tests of the Anticipated Discount Rate Change
Type of
Interest Discount Length of the Lead
Rate Rate change 10 20 30
FFR 1 1.95* 2.06* 2.53*
2+3 3.36* 2,08* 2.09*
RPR 1 1.52 1.40
2+3 1.73 1.33 1.79*
TBR 1 1.65 1.69* 1.34
2+3 3,4].* 2.64* 2.26*
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.Table 6
Response of Interest Rates to Discount Rate Changes, Partitioned
Around the Period of Non-Borrowed Reserve Targeting
Interest Rate
Independent
Variable FFR RPR TBR
Constant - .032 - .004 .054*
(1.73) (.21) (2.92)
L~.DR(l) Pre .060 .245* .072
(.40) (1.98) (.99)
LiDR(l) During .130 - .007 - .001
(.45) (.03) (.01)
t~.DR(l) Post .386 .363 .207*
(1.77) (1.80) (2.55)
~DR(2÷3) Pre .621* .164 .229*
(5.72) (1.82) (4.23)
L~DR(2±3) During 1.202* 1.029* ~744*
(5.00) (4.63) (6.96)
~DR(2÷3) Post .572* .589* .281*
(4.00) (4.48) (5.52)
-2
R .094 .077 .048
F1 4.86* 12.98* 18.54*
F2 .07 7.10* .51
F3 5.07* 2.89* 15.24*
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
F-tests are only for type 2 and 3 discount rate changes.
F1 tests the hypothesis that Pre = During.
F2 tests the hypothesis that Pre = Post.
F3 tests the hypothesis that During = Post.Table 7
Tests For Permanent Effects: The Drift Results
Independent
Interest Rate
* indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Variable FFR RPR TBR































































F(POS) 11.52* 9.02* 6.44* 1.44 .52 .45 .00 .29 .22
F(NEG) .43 .09 .00 5•43* 344* .81 .83 .01 .13
R .094 .096 .092 .123 .124 .124 .031 .031 .033
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